Class 14 Notes

The

Class 13 Notes

Truman Flatt & Sons V. Schupf 
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A party may retract their repudiation unless the other party materially changed position in reliance on this repudiation or the other party indicates that he considers the repudiation to be final.





Issue: Is a contract repudiation effective when the repudiation was retracted prior to the seller’s changing position or notifying the buyer that they believed the repudiation to be final?

Held: No. Judgment reversed and remanded.
A repudiation must be clear and unequivocal.
In the instant case, the Plaintiff’s letter to the Defendant seeking to modify the price term in the contract was not a clear and unequivocal repudiation.

Discussion: The court examined the language of the Plaintiff’s offer and found that it did not amount to repudiation because the offer did not clearly threaten nonperformance. The court analyzed the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to determine whether the repudiation, if there was one, was timely retracted. The court also looked to leading commentators on contract law to find that the weight of authority stood allowed a repudiating party to retract the repudiation before the aggrieved party chose to treat the contract as rescinded or before he materially changed position in reliance on the repudiation. If the aggrieved party did not change position, it must indicate to the repudiating party that it is treating the contract as rescinded. In the instant case, the court reasoned that the Defendant did not change position in that it did not sell the property to another party, nor did it even discuss selling the property to another party. Also, the Defendant never indicated to the Plain
tiff that it was treating the contract as rescinded until after the Plaintiff revoked its repudiation. Further, the court reasoned that even if the Plaintiff had repudiated the contract, he successfully retracted it because repudiation is timely retracted if it is retracted prior to the aggrieved party’s changing position in reliance on the repudiation or if it is retracted before the aggrieved party indicates to the repudiating party that it is considers the repudiation to be final.


Gibson v. City of Cranston: K to become superintendent of school district. Term in K that said there would be evaluation procedures – this was breached, and she resigned. The breach was not material though so she was entitled to damages, but had an obligation to keep performing. She breached K when she resigned so the damages of the initial breach were offset. To be material, the breach must frustrate the entire purpose of the K and make continued performance pointless.

§237. EFFECT ON OTHER PARTY’S DUTIES OF A FAILURE TO RENDER PERFORMANCE

Except as stated in §240, it is a condition of each party’s remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.

Comments....

d. Substantial performance. In an important category of disputes over failure of performance, one party asserts the right to payment on the ground that he has completed his performance, while the other party refuses to pay on the ground that there is an uncured material failure of performance....In such cases it is common to state the issue...in terms of whether there has been substantial performance....If there has been substantial although not full performance, the building contractor has a claim for the unpaid balance and the owner has a claim only for damages. If there has not be substantial performance, the building contractor has no claim for the unpaid balance, although he may have a claim in restitution.

Jacob & Young, Inc. V. Kent

Brief Fact Summary: In this case, pipe of similar quality, but of a different brand name than that specified in the contract, was used in the building of a house.

Synopsis of Rule of Law: Where a contract has been substantially performed and the cost of replacement would be grossly out of proportion to the difference in value, the correct measure of damages is the difference in value.

Issue: Is the difference in value the proper measure of damages when there has been substantial performance of a contract?                           or said
Would the use of substitute materials, of equal or greater quality to those specified in an agreement, bar substantial performance?


Held: Yes. Judgment affirmed.
The court found that the piping used was of similar quality to the Reading pipe specified in the contract.
The court also found that the failure to use the specified brand of pipe was not intentional or fraudulent, but a mere oversight.
The court also found that the cost to repair the defect would be grossly out of proportion to the difference in property value resulting from the defect. Therefore, the proper measure of damages was the difference in value caused by the error.

Dissent: The dissent argues that the Plaintiff did not perform the contract as specified and the Defendant has a right to have the terms of its contract met.

Discussion: Justice Cardozo began this opinion by examining the difference between promises and conditions. He reasons that where omissions are trivial and inconsequential they may be considered an independent promise and not a breach of a condition. However, some promises are so integral to the substance of the contract that they must be considered a condition of the contract. Whether something is a condition or a promise must be determined by considerations of justice and the intentions of the parties at the time they formed the contract. Justice Cardozo also recognizes that courts look to considerations of “fairness and equity” in determining whether something is an inconsequential promise or a contractual condition. Further, New York courts follow the liberal view and also consider the surrounding circumstances. Specifically, the courts “weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for deviation from the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence.” In the
instant case, the cost of replacing the pipes would be great but the difference in value caused by the use of the different brand of pipe would be nominal at most. Also, the use of the different pipe was a result of mere oversight, it was not an intentional or fraudulent deviation. Therefore, Justice Cardozo concluded that the cost of completion would be grossly out of proportion to the good to be attained from correcting the defect.

Decision/Analysis: (Cardozo, J.) The court felt that had the evidence provided by the plaintiff as to the similarity of the pipes made by the different manufactures been admitted, it would have provided a basis for the inference that the defect was insignificant in relation to the project.  In this case, an allowance should be made for the difference in value of the structure had the Reading pipe been used rather than the pipe of other manufacturers, which would be nominal or nothing.  “The owner is entitled to the money which will permit him to complete, unless the cost of completion is grossly and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained.  When that is true, the measure id the difference in value.”  The order was affirmed, and judgment absolute directed in favor of the plaintiff upon the stipulation, with costs in all courts.

SEE PAGE 719 - Bottom of Page

Relevant Facts: Pl, Mrs. Cope hired Df, Grun to install a new roof on her home. The K describes the color of the shingles to be used as “russet glow,” Df defined as “brown varied color.”  Df acknowledged that it was his obligation to install a roof uniform in color.  Df originally installed 24 squares.  Pl noticed afterward that it had streaks of yellow, due to a difference in color of some of the shingles.  Df agreed to remove and replace the non-conforming shingles.  The replacement shingles do not match the remainder.  The disparity in color has not disappeared in nine or ten months and the roof is not uniform in color.  The installation of a completely new roof is needed to produce the uniformity.  The roof is a substantial roof and will give Pl protection from the elements.

Legal Issue(s): Whether the Df, Grun, substantially performed the contract when his tendered performance was seriously deficient, and whether Df can recover under Quantum Meruit?

Court’s Holding: No, and No.

Procedure: Jury trial for the Pl, Df appealed.  Ct. of App.  Affirmed.

Law or Rule(s): A promisor who has substantially performed is entitled to recover, although he has failed in some particular to comply with his agreement.

Court Rationale: One of the most obvious factors in determining whether the performance amounts to substantial performance is the extent of the non performance.  The deficiency will not be tolerated if it is so pervasive as to frustrate the purpose of the K in any real or substantial sense.  The doctrine does not bestow upon the contractor license to install whatever is in his judgment “just as good.”   In the matter of homes and their decoration mere taste or preference, almost approaching whimsy, may be controlling by the homeowner, so that variations which might under other circumstances, be considered trifling, may be consistent w/ that “substantial performance,” on which liability to pay must be predicated.  The Pl can secure a roof of uniform color only by installing a new roof.  A contractor who tenders a performance so deficient that it can be remedied only by completely redoing the work has not substantially performed his contractual obligations.

There is evidence that the shingles were not properly installed, b/c if so the color would have blended and not streaked. The Pl did not receive a benefit but she will have to install a completely new roof, b/c of Df’s deficiency she will have to pay for a new roof. Pl did not accept the claimed benefit, she complained immediately and thereafter.

Plaintiff’s Argument: The Df did not comply with the provision of the contract, and a new roof needs to be installed to fix his deficiencies.

Defendant’s Argument: The Pl received a benefit of a roof to keep out the elements, the color variation is a slight deviation.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Class 10 Notes

Singer V. Dupont
Singer claims isn't the way it was supposed to be and claims that there was implied warranties on the side of Dupont.
Dupont claims that they made explicit warranties and therefore implied warranties won' matter
Ruling: Implied warranties can be attached to the explicit warranties.
Advice: Dupont should have had a disclaimer to any additional warranties
316 Article 2
Office Supply V. Basic Four

Issue: Whether the disclaimer in the contract was conspicuous.

Holding:  Although the D disclaimed the implied warranties twice and they were in italicized print, the disclaimers were not conspicuous.

Rationale:  An attempted disclaimer written in only slightly contrasting print and without a heading adequate to call the buyer's attention to the disclaimer clause was not effective.  The court relied on the ruling in Dorman v. International Harvester.  In this case, the two disclaimers in the contract are on the reverse sides of the first two pages of the contract. They are not positioned close to the buyer's signature line. The contracts are printed on pale green paper and the disclaimers are set forth in print which, although italicized, is only slightly contrasting with the remainder of the contract. There are no headings noting the disclaimers of warranty. Since there is only "'some slight contrasting set-off'" and there is "'only a slight contrast with the balance of the instrument, therefore, the disclaimers are not conspicuous.

Issue: Whether the disclaimer of the warranty is valid even thought it was not conspicuous in the contract.

Holding: If a buyer is actually aware of a warranty disclaimer, then the disclaimer is effective even if not conspicuous.

Rationale:  P’s testimony establishes that the warranty disclaimers were neither unexpected nor unbargained for, and that, consequently, under Dorman, they should be enforced.  The Official Comment to UCC § 2-316 states that the section is designed "to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer.”

The judicial loss that has developed:

Where the buyer knows of the disclaimer.

This semester:

Assume contract has been formed and that it is enforceable. What is it that the parties actually agreed to?

When is a party allowed to walk away or reneg on a promise?

What are situations where a failure to perform does not result in a breach?

Is there a condition?

Definition of a condition (event not certain to occur which must occur before performance is due?

Did the condition occur?

Lutinger V. Rosen

Facts: P contracted to buy D’s property conditional upon him obtaining a mortgage financing in the amount of $45,000 for interest rate not more than 8.5 percent per annum.  P promised to use due diligence.  P’s attorney handled the financing process and he only knew of one lending institution in the area that would meet P’s requirements.  Therefore, he applied for loan at this institution and the loan was offered but was above the 8.5 percent interest level.   P refused to accept that loan and asked D for the return of deposit.  D offered to fund the interest rate difference but P refused.

Procedure:  Lower court ruled in favor of P.

Issue:  Did the Plaintiffs exercise due diligence in seeking a mortgage in order to satisfy the condition precedent to performance of the contract?

Holding: Yes. The contract stipulated that the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Defendants’ premises was conditioned upon the Plaintiffs’ ability to procure financing in the amount of $45,000 for a term of at least twenty years and at an interest rate of less than 8.5%. The Plaintiffs’ attorney sought financing at the only lending institution in and around the area that might satisfy the condition precedent, but was unable to secure the mortgage at the desired rate. His failure to look elsewhere does not constitute a lack of due diligence. He was knowledgeable about lending practices in the area. Therefore, seeking another lender would have been a futile act and the law imposes no duty to undertake a futile act. Hence, since the condition precedent was not met, the contract is not binding and the plaintiffs are entitled to a refund of their deposit.
 

Rationale:  Under the K, P used due diligence.  P didn’t have to apply to lending institutions where he knew that his loan was not going to get approved.  “The law does not require the performance of a futile act.”  Furthermore, the K clearly stated the condition upon which the parties promised to purchase.  If this condition wasn’t met, P had no obligation to buy D’s property and was entitled to his deposit.  The fact that D made an additional offer to fund the interest rate difference does not change the original .  P had no obligation to accept D’s offer. Affirmed.

Discussion: A condition precedent to performance must be met before performance is required on a contract.

If contract did not say expressly that buyer did not say specifically that they will act in good faith, the law will apply it.

New Language: condition-percedent

In contract law a condition precedent is an event which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due, i.e., before any contractual duty arises.

For comparison, a condition subsequent brings a duty to an end whereas a condition precedent initiates a duty. Condition subsequent refers to an event or state of affairs that brings an end to something else. A condition subsequent is often used in a legal content as a marker bringing an end to one's legal rights or duties. A condition subsequent may be either an event or a state of affairs that must either (1) occur or (2) fail to continue to occur.

Oppenheimer V. Oppenheim (OAD)

Non occurence of condition means not bound.

A. Est-Freedom to contract

B. Predicability/Certainty

Pullman, Comley, Bradley and Reeves v. Tuck-it-away, Bridgeport, Inc. (1992)

A condition the parties did not agree to explicitly but that the law supplied.

Facts: Interpleader action between D and Vestpro (V); The parties signed a contract for the sale of real property, D seller and V buyer; V deposited $100K in escrow with D’s lawyers, P. This is the money in dispute. The contract stated that the closing date was December 10, 1988. V was allowed to extend the closing period for a fee and they did so four times. As the closing date approached they were short on funds, but D refused to allow another extension. On Dec. 10, nothing took place, but 4 doors later D received a letter from V attempting to cancel the contract on three grounds, including that a term of the contract, the size of a plot of land in question, was not accurately represented.  Neither party knew of the incorrect description of the land. Both parties claim the other violated the contract.

Issue Whether D’s agreement to deliver title was to simultaneous with the delivery of the money.

Holding:  The express language of paragraph 4 of the contract evidenced the parties' intent that the buyer's (Vestpro) d14uty to tender full payment of the purchase price was a condition precedent of the seller's (tuck-it-away) obligation to convey title to it.

Rule: A condition precedent is a fact or event which the parties intend must exist or take place before there is a right to performance.

Rationale: With respect to the time for performance of obligations contained in a contract, the general rule is: "Where all or part of the performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises can be rendered simultaneously, they are to that extent due simultaneously, unless the language of the circumstances indicate the contrary (Restatement 234).  Here, paragraph 4 of the contract provided: "At the closing, on payment of the purchase price as provided above, the seller shall deliver and the buyer shall accept, a full covenant Warranty deed . . . ." This language indicates that the parties agreed that the performances would not be rendered simultaneously, but rather that Vestpro's duty to perform would be a condition precedent to Tuck-it-away's obligation to tender and convey title. Because Vestpro failed on December 10, 1988, to tender the $ 1,800,000 balance due on the purchase price, Tuck-it-away was excused of its obligation to perform under the contract

Class 4 Notes

Review of Rule 8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRCP requires more than just a short an plain notice pleading in Rule 9(b) (pleadings of items of special damage)

You cannot require hightened pleading based on Rule 8

Some state & federal statutes may also require specificity in pleading
I.E. Securities Fraud
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stradford V. Zurich Insurance Co. 

ISSUE:  Must a party identify specific alleged misrepresentations when accusing a party of fraud?

Yes. FRCP 9(b) provides that all allegations of fraud shall be stated with particularity, and that allegations of intent may be set forth generally. Defendants' counterclaims properly allege that Plaintiff had fraudulent intent by pointing out the timing and size of his insurance claim; however, Rule 9(b) requires that the time, place, and nature of the alleged misrepresentations be disclosed to the party accused of fraud. Because Defendants' counterclaims fail to identify any alleged misrepresentation, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has indeed made any misrepresentations. The primary purpose of Rule 9(b) is to afford a litigant accused of fraud fair notice of the claim and the factual ground upon which it is based. Defendants' counterclaims fail to provide Plaintiff with any such notice, and therefore must be dismissed under Rule 9(b). Defendants, however, are granted leave to amend their counterclaims to more clearly allege that Plaintiff misrepresented the date of the loss in order to bring that date within the coverage period. Additionally, Defendants are granted permission to move for summary judgment.

Basic Rule:

Where a party is accused of fraud, FRCP 9(b) requires the time, place, and nature of the alleged misrepresentations to be disclosed to the party accused of fraud.

At the close of the pleading if they are insufficeint you may
1. file a 12(c)
2. a motion to strike
3. 12 (e) if filing for cases like fraud where more detail is required
4. 12 (b) 6 motion

See Slide Show on this class.
Meritless claim file Rule 11
If need more info - then file Rule 12(e)

Under Rule (b)
Mistake, Special Damages, must be files with greater detail specified in Rule 9 (b)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Class 3 Notes

Consostency in Pleading:

Why do we allow inconsistency in Pleading/Rationale?
Traditional Rational:
1. Attorney might not know all the facts and we view pleadings as prelimanry sketches

The Policy appraoch Rational:
2. We want to create access to justice and we don't want to keep people out because they are unsure of the exact facts.

The Pleading complaint in Haddle strats on Page 340

Rule 8 (2) Issue:

What does the Drafting mean:
How much detail or specificity does Rule 8 required?

Connley:
Rule 8: The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim....

Letherman and serena case say that the court cannot impose a hightened standard of pleading.

Conley V. Gibson:

On what grounds does the court support It's conclusion?
1. Fair notice and griounds
2. Rule 8(e) - construed to do justice
3. Pleading - Not a game of skill
4. Decision on the merits of the case

Bell Atlantic V. Twombly: (the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy)

Issues:

• Can an antitrust claim survive a motion to dismiss when it only alleges that the monopolists engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting conspiracy or agreement to do so?
• Are there any other times besides fraud and mistake cases when complaints that conform to FRCP 8(a)(2) are insufficient?

Holding/Rule:

• An antitrust claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss when it only alleges that the monopolists engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, if there is no factual context suggesting conspiracy or agreement to do so.
• An antitrust claim is insufficient if it only conforms to FRCP 8(a)(2); it must include some contextual facts that make the claim plausible.

Reasoning:

• The factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.
• At the summary judgment stage, an antitrust P's offer of conspiracy evidence must tend to rule out the possibility that the Ds were acting independently.
• Something beyond the mere possibility of impropriety must be alleged so that Ps with groundless claims cannot be allowed to take up the time of other people during the discovery phase.
• Antitrust discovery is very expensive; the threat of this expense will push cost-conscious Ds to settle even weak cases.
• Conley's "no set of facts" doctrine needs to be retired and replaced.
• Nothing in the complaint intimates that the resistance to the upstarts was anything more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each D intent on keeping its regional dominance.
• If alleging parallel decisions to resist competition were enough to imply an antitrust conspiracy, pleading an antitrust violation against almost any group of competing businesses would be a sure thing.
• There is a plausible explanation for the noncompetition of the Ds -- each was sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same.
• "We do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the Ps have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed."

Dissent:

• The simplified notice pleading standard of the FRCP relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.
• The fact that the Sherman Act authorizes the recovery of 3x damages and attorney's fees for successful plaintiffs indicates that Congress intended to encourage private enforcement of the law. 

Haddle V. Twombly 12(B)(6) Motion:
1. Haddle the law did not provide property right.
2. Twombly the plaintiff should have included more facts
Difference: Twombly has more of a chance to replead.

Twombly failed:
1. Lack of detail
2. Conspiracy allegations - conclusory

What else could P have alleged?

Standard by which to measure the validity of claims: (stricter pleading)
Sais we need a plausibility standard?

Facts need to be more than possible and less that probable but at least plausible.

Ashcroft V. Iqbal:
Why does the supreme court takes Ashcroft?
High profile and would have grave consequences on law enforcement proceedings for government

Dissent:
What are the facts in the complaint are they a realm of the reality?

Should Rule 8 be revised?

Class 2 Notes

The Art and Science of Pleading

Notice Pleading:
1. Complaints
Guided by RCP - Include:
A. Set of facts which
B. Invoke some body of law
C. Entitling P to relief

2. Once Drafted
Filed with court
Docket Number
Serve

Pleading and Motions

Defendant responds to the complaint:
1. Rule 12 Defendant cam
A. Answer
B. Assert preliminary objections in a motion - Rule 12(b)

Defendant Must Respond:
A. Within 21 days after being served
B. Within 60 days if returned waiver (Rule 4(d)) of service
C. Within 90 days if D outside of JD of US

Challenging Pleadings

Haddle V. Garrison

Where are the Jurisdictional allegations?

Where can you find the prayer?

What's in between? Short and plain statement of the facts for articulation by counsel

What kind of legal claim is Haddle's Story? A civil rights violation

How does the Lawyer create a Civil Rights Story from Haddle being fired to get it into Federal Court? The language used in the complaint was taken out of the constitution "Retaliating and Intimidating" "Terminating due to the fact that he was a Federal Witness" Paragraph 18, 16 

Claim: Injured in Property

Defense: At-Will employee  -  

D Files Rule 12(b) 6 Motion

2 ways to file this motion

A. Insufficient facts - poor pleading

B. Claim not cognizable - doesn't exist

If the claim is not cognizable - Cannot refile.

If 12(b) 6 challenge is a factual dispute: If facts are introduced that are not part of the pleading the court may convert this into summary judgement un Rule 12(d)

Recourse for Plaintiff:

1. Appeal

2. Re-plead

Court was bound by precedant and could not solve case any other way

Court of appeals dispose the case summarily based on precedant

After losing appeal plaintiff filed a writ of Certiorari

Plaintiff is motivated and there is a possibility that being that there was a circuit split there maybe hope of the USSC taking the case.

Supreme Court:

Defendants arguement to the Supreme Court?

Supreme Court refocuses the inquiry. The Statute does not require

The Court awards him 50K based on compensatory damages.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Whats a....

Pleading? /  Motion?

Rule 7(a)    Rule 7(b)

ADD CHART

See PP on TWEN

Class 1 Notes

Civil Litigation

Read: Rule 7(A) 1-7

Page 266, Facts:

Torts Case, Personal Injury Case:
A. The Judgment will be for the Plaintiff for a Median of 48K
C. Not many cases go to trial and case may never come to Jury Selection
D. Not many of those federal cases and only a small % of those are diversity cases
E. Normally you would be trying smaller cases.

Remedies Facts:
Car Accident Injury Case:
Lawyer would want to Know:
A. Liability
B. What the client wants
C. Is there Insurance (Deep Pockets)
D. Financial displacement of the client
E. Damages and Extent of Harm

The Next Step: Rule 8
File a Pleading: Pleading rules require the plaintiff to say what he wants the court to do for him

Rule 8(a) Called the Prayer
Damages are most common "prayer"

Damages Sought From:
A. Defendants Assets - K Cases
B. Insurance - Tort Cases
C. Self Insurance
D. Indemnifiers

Amount of Damages and what damages your seeking may shape:
A. Court selection.
B. Other Parties (deeper pockets) to be joined
C. Depth of discovery
D. Settlement Strategy
E. Number and kind of expert witnesses
F. Bench or Jury Trial
G. Likelihood of Appeal

If done with INTENT:
A. Insurance may not cover Amy for Intent
B. Could create greater Punitive Damages

Suppose Amy starts Harassing Bruce: Further relief -
A. Temporary restraining order
B. Damages for Emotional Distress

Remedy Options for Amy taking Bruce's property:
A. Specific Relief
1. Replevine

Remedy for Amy planning to take property:
A. Specific Relief
1. Injunction

Controversy over Property:
A. Specific Relief
1. Quite Title

Substitutionary VS. Specifc Relief
Relief can either be Legal or Equitable

Legal:
Damages
Ejectment
Repliven
(a regular court would have provided)

Equitable
Injuction
quiet title
constructive trust
(a chancery court would have provided)

Equitable claims are tried in a Bench trial by a judge
Under Rule 52(A) Court must issue opinion or result with detailed assessment.

Costs of Lititgation:
A. Lawyers
B. Expert and Investigators
C. Filing Fess
D. Process Servers
E. Court Reporters
F. Photocopy
G. Technology
etc.

hIBRID sYSTEM:

A. Fess for Service
B. Fess Spreading
C. Fee Shifting Statutes
D. Legal Aid, Pro-Bono, Public Interest, Philanthropy

Class Action Law Suits

Non Fee Shift Cases
A. Divorce and Child Custody.

Pleading Grow from Clients Stories.
A. Human Story
Pleading system in which you operate determines how the story gets told base on what system see as relevant

Function of Pleadings:
1. Invoke Court Jurisdiction
2. Eliminate contentions with no legal signifigance
3. Notice of facts and nature of claims to:
    A. Parties
    B. Courts

Pages 333-334 Complaints:
Approaches to Pleading:
1. Writ Technical
2. Code - Specific and Detailed; allege facts; adhere to statutes; More fact based; In Code pleading states you will see Code Forms due to required detail.
FRCP - uses - Notice Pleading
1. Less specific
2. Doesn't significantly narrow any issues for trial
3. Doesn't require a particular form

Comparing Program Pleadings:
The more specificity requires the more difficult and expensive it is to draft a complaint.
Less Specificity delays the point at which defendant/plaintiff can learn key facts

Modern Pleading (federal courts)
Rule 1.
FRCP governs process for modern pleadings.
Efficiency

Rule 2.
Creates on form of action
abolishes common law writ system (courts of law and equity can be brought in same court)

Rule 8(d) 1
Allegations simple concise and direct
no technical; pleading forms are necessary

Rule 8(e)
All pleading should be construed to do substantial justice

Rule 3
A civil action is commenced by filing an action with the court

Filing Fee:
$350
seek court permission to proceed in forma pauperis

Rule 10:
A. Caption - Name of Parties (rule 7a pleading)
B. Paragraphs should be sperately numbered
 Single set of circumstances sperate paragraphs
C. adoption by reference and exhibits

Rule 84
Forms Sufficient

Rule 7(a) Types of pleading that may filed in federal court 1-7
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/Rule7.htm

Rule 8(a) What is required in claim:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/Rule8.htm
1. Notice pleadfing
2. Flexible
3. Low barrier to entry

The Art of a Pleading:
Minimalist?
Avoiding providing to much information
Detail and Specificity?
Educate judge etc.

Complaints:
Guide for RCP include:
1.
2.
3,

Challenging Pleading:
Rule 12 Motions challenge
Rule 8 Defenses i.e. denials